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‘Why do we need another book on this?’ asks Brian Farrell at the beginning of The 
Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942.  In the light of the extensive literature and the 
publication of three additional works on the subject, it is a pertinent question.  By 1998 
no less than 168 books had appeared in English on the fall and occupation of Singapore.  
It is improbable that the official enquiry, which Churchill promised but never instigated, 
would have stemmed this flow of publications, but, in its absence, the reasons for the loss 
of the so-called impregnable fortress became subject to special pleading and enveloped in 
myth, mystery and misinformation.  While participants justified their actions or criticised 
those of others, until official papers were released historians tended to focus on the 
interwar years during which the naval base was developed as a major component of 
imperial defence. When, however, British government files for 1941-42 were opened in 
1993, the Malayan campaign came under renewed scrutiny.   
 
 Leading the charge was Peter Elphick, a master mariner turned historian, whose 
Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress: A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion came 
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out in 1995.  Although parts of this book digressed into byways (as in the 
disproportionate space devoted to the intelligence activities of  John Becker), or provoked 
bitter recriminations (notably the account of wholesale desertion by Australian troops), or 
were dismissed as preposterous (such as the significance attributed to Patrick Heenan, the 
Japanese spy), Elphick’s mission to expose what he regarded as a fifty-year cover-up 
stimulated research in British and Australian archives and also on the Japanese material 
that had survived the war.  Scholars now sought explanations for Japanese success and 
British failure, instead of looking for scapegoats and apportioning blame.  They moved 
on from the facile stereotypes and glib judgments of hindsight to a more thoughtful 
treatment of the dilemmas and dangers facing decision-makers at the time.  While 
historians have continued to examine the tiffs and tactics and the blunders and blind-spots 
of political, military and colonial leaders (Churchill, Dill, Brooke-Popham, Duff Cooper, 
Percival, Tom Phillips, Heath, Shenton Thomas, Tojo, Yamashita, Tsjui Masanobu, 
Fujiwara Iwaichi, and so on), they have done so in the contexts of diplomacy, empire and 
war, and also by reference to the experiences of fighting men, civilian expatriates and 
Malayan residents. The sixtieth anniversary of the fall was marked by the publication of 
Alan Warren’s Singapore 1942: Britain’s Greatest Defeat, which embodied this broader 
approach, and by an international conference held in Singapore whose proceedings were 
published in 2003 as Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore Revisited edited by Brian 
Farrell and Sandy Hunter. Also inspired by the anniversary, Karl Hack and Kevin 
Blackburn brought out Did Singapore have to fall? Churchill and the Impregnable 
Fortress  (2004, see JICH, 32, 3 (Sept. 2004), 158-59). In the same year, the Singapore 
University Press published the late Henry Frei’s ground-breaking work, Guns of 
February: Ordinary Japanese Soldiers’ Views of the Malayan Campaign and the Fall of 
Singapore 1941-41, which drew upon written and oral memories to inform a western 
readership for the first time of the varied experiences and subsequent reflections of 
Japanese combatants.  
 
 What do Farrell, Smith and Thompson add to our knowledge and understanding 
of this episode, and how do they differ from each other?  Between them they have 
gathered together an immense amount of information and each claims to present fresh 
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and comprehensive evidence to dispel misconceptions and provide a definitive account of 
the campaign.  Yet they are unlikely to have pronounced the obsequies on a topic which, 
as Hack and Blackburn have written, is subject to a ‘never-ending post-mortem’.  Some 
may be perplexed by the failure of these authors to engage fully with the work of other 
historians or to explain precisely how they are adding to previous research.  Moreover, 
none cites sources as extensively as one might expect of an historian who is bent on 
establishing a copper-bottomed thesis. Even Farrell, who is a commanding presence in 
this field, has relegated his full set of notes and references to a website and provided 
readers of his book with only a list of sources. As regards interpretation, the explanations 
offered by the three authors seem similar and feel familiar in all essentials.  This degree 
of consensus is perhaps a mark of the current state of the subject, since it is now, as 
Thompson puts it, ‘relatively simple to list the reasons for the defeat’. If so, the trick lies 
in listing them in the right order or giving each its due weight. Be that as it may, the 
ground which the authors hold in common may be summarised as follows.  
 
 The plan to send the main fleet to Singapore in the event of a Far Eastern crisis 
was militarily unrealistic from the moment it was adopted. Imperial overstretch meant 
that during the 1920s and 1930s the region was a low priority for top quality 
commanders, staff and equipment. After the outbreak of war in Europe followed by 
reverses in the Mediterranean and North Africa, resources could not be spared to support 
the Singapore strategy.  Their allocation was further complicated by the politics of the 
Commonwealth alliance and Anglo-American relations which in the end necessitated a 
military gesture by Britain in the Far East, no matter how futile. In December 1941 
Britain’s naval deterrent, which amounted to a force of two capital ships plus an escort of 
destroyers, was annihilated for want of air cover. This meant that the army, which had 
been widely deployed in the peninsula to defend inadequately stocked air fields, 
unexpectedly assumed responsibility for the protection of a naval base which was now 
indefensible and redundant. As British, Australian and Indian forces retreated south to 
Singapore, they were joined by recent arrivals who were poorly prepared for the fray.  
Since their commanders could produce no alternative to ‘muddling through’, they were 
no match for what Farrell has identified as Yamashita’s ‘driving charge’.   
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 The three authors tell a dispiriting tale which is occasionally relieved by instances 
of heroism and humanity. Where they differ is in the attention they pay to the leaders and 
the led.  Professor Farrell, who teaches History at the National University of Singapore 
and has published extensively on the military history of the British empire, traces defeat 
to systemic problems of military planning whose sound principles were subverted by the 
politics of imperial defence. He goes on to show how defeat was then turned into disaster 
by the miscalculations of commanders on the spot. While he by no means neglects the 
‘poor bloody infantry’, Farrell’s prime interest is in the decision-makers and his main 
sources are the records of high policy held at the Australian War Memorial, the India 
Office Records (British Library), The National Archives (Kew) and the US Army Centre 
for Military History, to which he has added the private papers of principal players such as 
Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham and Generals Heath and Percival. Colin Smith and 
Peter Thompson, by contrast, were journalists before becoming full-time authors. Smith 
covered many conflicts for the London Observer, including the fall of Saigon in 1975.  
Thompson worked on the Melbourne Sun before moving to London to join the Mirror 
group and eventually to edit the Sunday Mirror. They have approached the fall of 
Singapore less as investigative journalists seeking the reason why and more as reporters 
describing what happened from the observations and reminiscences of those who were 
there. As far as possible they follow operations through the eyes of the combatants. Their 
heroes include Ian Stewart of the Argylls, Tim Vigors of the RAF, the campaign’s four 
VCs and Ben Hackney who miraculously survived the Parit Sulong massacre.  Smith 
identifies dignity and humanity on the Japanese side, too, but he and Thompson share a 
contempt for the Australian general, Gordon Bennett. One senses, however, that, 
compared with Farrell’s full immersion, Smith and Thompson have merely dipped into 
government papers.  They prize above all else interviews with survivors or written 
testimonies collected, for example, in the Imperial War Museum, Australian War 
Museum, or regimental archives. They both tend to allow eyewitness accounts to drive 
their narratives but, since some would have been compiled long after the event, it would 
have been helpful had Smith and Thompson reflected further on the use of memories as 
historical sources. 
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 Key words from the titles of these books - fall, surrender and disaster – suggest a 
preoccupation with the decline and fall of British power.  Just as Suez 1956 is said to 
have marked the end of ‘Britain’s moment in the Middle East’, Singapore 1942 has 
acquired similar significance for the British empire in Asia. Yet, none of the authors 
explores in any great depth the extent to which it marked a turning point in either the 
course of the war or the fortunes of the empire. While Thompson unquestioningly accepts 
that defeat ‘sounded the death knell for British rule in South East Asia’, Farrell and Smith 
ponder a little longer on its impact.  Farrell contends that Japan’s victory in February 
1942 did not determine the outcome of the Pacific War: it became a secondary event for 
the Japanese and is scarcely mentioned in American accounts.  Moreover, Japan’s 
triumph was soon followed by military reverses while Britain was saved from total 
eclipse by American support which Pearl Harbor had already secured.  Both Farrell and 
Smith point out that, for all its deleterious effects on British prestige in the world, on 
British power in Asia and on British relations with Australia, Singapore 1942 neither 
ended nor initiated the ending of empire.  While disaster in Singapore may, as Farrell 
puts it,  have ‘helped the British decide to walk away from their empire’, it has to be 
remembered that its immediate effect was to strengthen their commitment to a South East 
Asian empire.  It also gave them no end of a lesson in its defence. So it was that, when 
they returned in 1945, the British re-established a base in Singapore which would remain 
the centre of their power in the region for the next twenty-five years.  
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